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The National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) 
establishes a working set of guidelines for the ethical conduct for research 
within Australian Universities. One of the primary principles relates to questions 
of “public good.” The question of public good comes under the principle of 
beneficence. Beneficence involves an ethical judgment about whether “the 
likely benefits of the research must justify any risks of harm or discomfort to the 
participants, to the wider community, or to both.” (National Statement, p. 13). 
The question of minimizing risk and discomfort becomes a key point of tension 
when artists become engaged in artistic research and their ‘research’ becomes 
subject to the guidelines of The National Statement. Driven by the aesthetics of 
the sublime, the avant-garde impetus demands that art produces discomfort and 
brings its audience into crisis. For artists this discomfort and crisis is precisely 
art’s benefit, whilst for an ethics committee such discomfort may be deemed 
an unacceptable risk. Here-in lies a conflict between the notion of beneficence 
as defined by the code and those recognized by the artistic community. It raises 
the question: What is the value of art to a society if it becomes so comfortable 
that it no longer provokes artistic shock? Through an examination of the work of 
socially engaged artists Amy Spiers and Catherine Ryan, this essay examines how 
artists reconfigure the notion of beneficence as a principle that incorporates 
provocation and discomfort.
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Introduction 
This paper investigates a conflicting understanding of beneficence—between those views 
held by contemporary artists and artistic researchers and the principle of beneficence 
enshrined in The National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007), 
the code of behavior that underpins the ethical conduct of research within Australian 
Universities. The National Statement defines beneficence as the minimization of harm 
and discomfort to research subjects and participants. Contemporary artists, on the 
other hand, propose that art’s beneficence may necessarily incorporate provocation and 
discomfort in order to illuminate the important ethical issues of our epoch. This ‘conflict’ 
in understanding is not at issue until those artists enter the academy and undertake 
higher research degrees where they are required to negotiate the ethics process. It raises 
the question:  What are the ethical and aesthetic stakes involved in producing provocative 
and discomforting art when art becomes research? What are the challenges for artistic 
researchers working in the academy and what are the issues for the ethics committees 
that have oversight over artistic research? Through an examination of the artistic 
performance events Nothing to See Here (Dispersal) and Say Nothing, artworks involving 
the artistic researcher Amy Spiers, and by referring to a number of key performance 
events in the canon of performance and participatory art—Marina Abramovic’s Lips 
of Thomas (1975), Vito Acconci’s Claim (1971), Mike Parr’s Cathartic Action (1977) 
and Malevich (2002) and Christoph Schlingensief’s Please Love Austria (2001)—this 
essay addresses the question of ethics and beneficence in art and sets out some of the 
implications for artistic research in the academy.
In March 2014, two Melbourne artists, Amy Spiers and Catherine Ryan (in collaboration 
with choreographer and dramaturge Ashley Dyer), staged their work-in-progress Nothing 
to See Here (Dispersal) as part of Melbourne’s Festival of Live Art (see Figures 1, 2 and 3). 
The work was a response to the ‘Occupy Melbourne’ protest, part of the global ‘Occupy’ 
movement that occurred during 2011. ‘Occupy Melbourne,’ like elsewhere, resulted in 
repression by the police. The protest was brutally broken up and the crowds dispersed, 
leaving empty barricaded spaces of no entry. “Move along, there’s nothing to see” 
became the mantra that the authorities used to divide and separate the protesters and 
move along anyone else in the orbit of the occupation. 
In two staged performances, Spiers and Ryan adopted the crowd dispersal techniques 
of the police to choreograph a performative encounter with a regime of power. During 
the forty five-minute performances, the audience-becoming-performers were variously 
directed, herded, divided, expelled or corralled into cordoned off spaces, and denied any 
possibility of free assembly or movement by the uniformed controllers.  These controllers 
were instructed in and employed the techniques of crowd controllers, security guards, 
ushers and police to “divide and separate” the audience (Spiers 2014, p. 1-2)1 .
The strategy employed by the artists was inspired by Jacque Rancière’s analysis of social 
control, which posits that political order is not merely maintained by political repression, 
but rather is effected through strategies of controlling visibility (to see is to believe) and 
the flow of people in public spaces. As Rancière comments:
Police intervention in public space is less about interpellating demonstrators than it 
is about dispersing them. […] The police are above all certitude about what is there, 
or rather, about what is not there: “Move along, there’s nothing to see.” The police 
say there is nothing to see, nothing happening, nothing to be done but to keep 
moving, circulating; they say that the space of circulating is nothing but the space of 
circulation. (Rancière 2010, p. 37).
In the case of any social or political rupture, says Gene Flenady, the “visibility of 
force always effaces itself in the production of invisibility” (Flenady, 2014).
By making visible such forces, Spiers and Ryan aimed to deconstruct and reveal the 
mechanisms by which political order is maintained in ‘public’ spaces. The means 
they chose was not just to produce a performance that illustrated a sense of dis-
ease, but rather one that provoked and enacted unease and discomfort in its 
audience; they invited an audience into a space and then denied them the very right 
of free assembly. Whilst audience members were allowed to leave voluntarily, the 
mechanisms of control ensured that the exercise of freedom was a difficult choice to 
make. Here the politics of aesthetics came face-to-face with questions of ethics.
There is a very critical issue that faces us in thinking about Nothing to See Here 
(Dispersal). Amy Spiers and Catherine Ryan are artists and this work was created in 
the context of the artworld. In such a context, artists would agree that the ‘true’ 
arena of ethical determination is in the community and thus, according to such a 
determination, aesthetic and ethical judgments about art are made by art critics, 
art viewers and the general public (Bolt et al. 2010, p. 10). However, Spiers is also 
an artistic researcher who is engaged in artistic research. What are the ethical and 
aesthetic stakes involved when such a performative work of art becomes research?
In Australia, all research, including artistic research, is conducted in accord with The 
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) (more commonly 
referred to as The National Statement), which establishes a set of working guidelines 
for the ethical conduct for research within Australian Universities. It is not meant 
to provide a prescribed list of do’s and don’t, but rather to set up an ethos or set 
of principles that underpins the way that researchers who are engaged in research 
with human subjects approach their research. The preamble to the National 
Statement provides the rational for codifying a set of ethical principles to oversee 
the relationship between researchers and the research participants. It cites “the 
deliberate and appalling violation of human beings” during “the Second World 
War experiments in detention and concentration camps,” as the impetus for the 
development of a code of conduct for researchers (National Statement, p. 3). One of 
the first principles set out in the preamble is that of trust between participants and 
a researcher. A second relates to questions of public good:
Research often involves public interaction between people that serves a public 
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Figure 1. Amy Spiers and Catherine Ryan, Nothing to See Here (Dispersal), 2014. Photo by John Possemato.
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good. There is, therefore, a public responsibility for seeing that these 
interactions are ethically acceptable to the Australian community (National 
Statement, p. 4).
The question of public good comes under the principle of beneficence. Beneficence 
involves an ethical judgment about whether “the likely benefits of the research must 
justify any risks of harm or discomfort to the participants, to the wider community, or to 
both.” (National Statement, p.13).  In the academic context at least, researchers (and this 
includes artistic researchers) should:
•	 design the research to minimize the risks of harm or discomfort to participants;
•	 clarify for participants the potential benefits and risks of the research; and 
•	 care for the welfare of the participants in the research context (The National 
Statement, p. 13, my emphasis).
Here-in lies a conflict between the notions of beneficence as defined by the code and 
those recognized by the artistic community. We have seen from our earlier discussion of 
Nothing to See Here (Dispersal) that the question of harm, in the form of discomfort, is 
a much more complex issue than it first appears. What is the value of art to a society if 
it doesn’t confront the key issues that threaten fundamental human rights? What if art 
becomes so comfortable that it no longer provokes artistic shock? 2  Thus the question of 
minimizing risk and discomfort that is inherent in the notion of beneficence becomes a 
key point of tension when artists become engaged in artistic research and their research 
becomes subject to the guidelines of The National Statement. 
In 2011, Spiers first encountered the complexities of research ethics whilst studying for 
a Masters of Fine Arts (MFA) at the Victorian College of the Arts, at the University of 
Melbourne. As the MFA is a research degree, Spiers was required to abide by the rules 
of conduct in research in the University and gain ethics approval for particular aspects of 
the research project, since the research design involved human subjects as participants/
subjects in the research. She applied for ethics approval for a number of instruction-
based and performance works including the work, Say Nothing.3 Say Nothing is an 
instructional artwork that was exhibited as part of a public exhibition at the Margaret 
Lawrence Gallery at the Victorian College of the Arts in 2011. The instructions for the 
work were set up as a wall text next to a space where the work ‘would happen’ through 
the duration of the exhibition. The instructions were very simple. In order to become a 
participant in the work, visitors were asked to:
write their mobile phone number on the gallery wall, with no other identifying 
personal information. In exchange, they must take a note of the number that was 
left by the participant before them, and then cross it out with a black marker. 
Only one phone number should be available on the gallery wall at a time. The 
participant is then instructed to call the number when convenient, and say 
nothing. On answering the phone to this silent caller, the receiver is also directed 
to not exchange any words. Instead both participants are asked to spend a little 
time on the line together, hanging up when either decides they’ve had enough. 
The aim is to create a private one-on-one experience that is meant to frustrate 
the participants’ desire to connect with one another. There is no documentation 
of the calls except for the effaced numbers on the gallery wall (Spiers 2011 p. 36-
37).
Say Nothing required that the participants “put their trust to the test” (Spiers 2011, p. 36) by 
allowing a stranger to take their number and follow the instructions. The participants were also 
to follow the instructions given; ring the number that they had written down and say nothing. 
In its response to the ethics application that Spiers submitted for Say Nothing, the Victorian 
College of the Arts (VCA) Human Ethics Advisory Group (HEAG), sent the following response 
concerning the proposed artwork:
The HEAG has significant concerns about the … implications for participants in this 
project…. The ethical principle of beneficence is key here as there could be significant 
issues should someone take another person’s phone number and use it for purposes 
other than those outlined in the project ... It is extremely difficult to ensure that there 
will definitely be no harassment of participants by other participants – this is a risk that is 
difficult to control or manage.4
Whilst it is often said that Ethics Committees engage in risk management, ultimately their 
decisions are guided and underpinned by the fundamental principles of the code, including 
those of beneficence and trust.5 In her assessment of the project, Spiers made the following 
comments revealing that “trust” was at issue:
Say Nothing strongly evoke an imagined sense of the silent calls, even if the viewer 
decides not to partake in the experience…. The silence and non-documented nature of 
the calls suggests something powerfully enigmatic, even to the non-participant. Even 
the viewers who do not participate are implicated in the provocation of Say Nothing, 
producing an intriguing effect, as the viewer realises they do not possess the trust to 
become involved (Spiers 2011, p. 38).
For Spiers, the work addressed fundamental questions about human relations of trust and the 
capacity of an art project to trouble and test such questions. 
Spiers’ thinking about the capacity of art to ‘trouble and test,’ concurs with a position, 
strongly held in the arts community, that the speculative and provocative nature of 
art (and art as research) enables it to become a site of engagement for ethical debate 
and hence gives art the ability to illuminate the ethical issues of our epoch. For many 
artists, both those working in the arena of socially engaged art and those driven by the 
avant-garde impulse, art should maintain its social critical role at the edge in order to 
test and trouble society’s ethical and moral boundaries.6 Art acts as a provocation; it 
operates as the conscience of a society, it produces discomfort and brings its audience 
into crisis (Bolt et al 2010, p.16). For artists this discomfort and crisis is precisely art’s 
benefit, both to the participants and to the wider community, whilst for an ethics 
committee such discomfort may be deemed an unacceptable risk. Here, two notions of 
beneficence collide as aesthetic judgment meets ethical judgment. 
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Figure 2. Amy Spiers and Catherine Ryan, Nothing to See Here (Dispersal), 2014. Photo by John Possemato.
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In the West, despite the critique of modernism and the avante-garde by postmodernism, 
art remains deeply indebted in its allegiance to the principles of the aesthetics of 
the sublime and the avant-garde, and in this, its principles are deeply political and 
emancipatory. Yet, in its avant-garde form, the emancipatory and political claims are 
not necessarily care-full, since its aim is to produce discomfort and movement in both 
thought and deed. The idea that art should provoke discomfort and unease has its roots 
in philosophical discourses around art and aesthetics, most notably in the work of Jacques 
Rancière, Martin Heidegger, Walter Benjamin and Jean François Lyotard.  
In his essay, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (1935-6) Martin Heidegger introduces the 
concept of “strife” as a fundamental principle in art. Martin Heidegger’s position on 
aesthetics is complicated by the ethical. He is very critical of the aesthetic framing of art, 
arguing that aesthetics robs art of its essential and necessary role in understanding our 
Being.7 Heidegger believes that aesthetics reduces art to mere experience and pleasure 
and, as such, stops us questioning the Being of human beings. In the place of enjoyment 
or aesthetic experience, Heidegger offers us strife. Strife, Heidegger explains, ‘does not 
happen so that the work should at the same time settle and put an end to strife by an 
insipid agreement, but so that the strife may remain a strife’ (Heidegger 1977, p.175). 
The word “strife” immediately brings to mind an event where there is a bitter struggle, 
or violent conflict. However, Heidegger makes it clear that it is not the artist who creates 
strife, but rather that it is the work of art that creates strife.8 Here, Heidegger steers us 
away from accepting our common-sense understanding of strife as a destructive force, 
making the point that if we were to equate strife with discord and dispute, we would only 
ever experience disorder and destruction (Heidegger 1977, p.175). Strife is not wanton 
destruction. In strife, Heidegger tells us, ‘each opponent carries itself beyond itself’ 
(Heidegger 1977, 175). To go beyond oneself, he considers is essential to what it means 
to be human.9 Further, Heidegger maintains that the work of art isn’t concerned with 
resolving strife so that we can ‘enjoy’ or feel comfortable. Strife is set in motion so that it 
can remain strife. Applying Heidegger’s notion of strife to Say Nothing and Nothing to See 
Here (Dispersal), it could be argued that the strife was not that Spiers and Ryan wanted to 
promote terror and fear. Rather, their aim was to provide the conditions that enabled the 
work to enact the nature of trust/distrust and the power of dispersal, in order to reveal 
the very dynamics of power that operate in the repression of such events as the Occupy 
movement.
Whilst Heidegger’s notion of strife offers an ethical intervention into aesthetics, Lyotard 
suggests that avant-garde art is driven by the “esthetics of the sublime” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 
40)., a concept that is concerned with putting the ‘subject’ into crisis.10 In his assessment 
of the stakes involved in the postmodern sublime, Lyotard claims that the “the avant-garde 
does not worry about what happens to the “subject”.” Rather, its primary concern is: “Is it 
happening?” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 41). Thus Lyotard tells us that:
The arts, with whatever their materials pressed forward by the esthetics of the 
sublime in a quest for intense effects … must test their limits through surprising, 
difficult, shocking combinations. Shock is par excellence, the evidence of (something) 
happening, rather than nothing at all. It is suspended privation (Lyotard, 1984, p. 40).
In this raw state, or intensification of being, all thought is disarmed. He says that,  “(i)n 
questioning the “It happens,” avant-garde art abandons … (any) identifying role in relation 
to the receiving community” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 41). Thus, the aim of the work of art is not 
to please its receiving community or bring it “into a process of identification”, but rather 
to provide a shock to the senses (Lyotard, 1984, p. 39). This ‘shock’, he claims, provides 
the foundations of the transformative power of art.
The issue of identification and imaginative engagement raises a question that has been 
taken up by those committed to developing work around research ethics.  As philosopher 
Jeffrey Dean (2013) points out, it is difficult to take seriously the ethical benefits of 
imaginative engagement with art without acknowledging its potential dangers. So how do 
we make a judgment call about the question of the value of imaginative engagement, that 
is, whether there is a greater good for the community emanating from the “shock” of the 
work of art, or whether this is pure terror. This is a difficult question, but one that harks 
back to Kant’s notion of an imagined community and his belief that in judgments of taste, 
the individual ought to so judge.11 
A study entitled ‘Human Research Ethics in Practice: Deliberative Strategies, Processes 
and Perceptions’ by Lynn Gillam, Marilys Guillemin, Annie Bolitho and Doreen Rosenthal, 
identified “imaginative identification” as a strategy for guiding ethical judgment on such 
questions (Gillam et al, 2009, p. 7). Imaginative identification involves putting yourself 
in the shoes of another person; of being able to empathise or imagine what it would 
be like if you were the one who was subject to a particular situation or practice. How 
would you feel if this was done to you?12 However, as we have seen, the aesthetics of 
sublime deals with the incommensurable; it is beyond imagining. Lyotard tells us that in 
a sublime encounter the imagination fails, producing a “kind of cleavage with the subject 
between what can be conceived and what can be imagined” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 40). This is 
the event where there is the possibility that nothing further may happen. These are the 
stakes for an artist.
Herein lies the dilemma. In the performative act or the event, where there can be a loss 
of self/other, aesthetic and ethical judgment is suspended. We cannot imagine what may 
happen precisely because it is beyond imagination. In this context it is very difficult to ask 
in advance; should it happen?, since the ‘Is it happening?’, will only emerge in the event 
and not in advance of it.
The impetus to bring an audience into crisis, to deprive them of identification, brings us 
back to the question of ethics:
•	 What do we understand by “shock” or, what I have termed elsewhere, “the 
shock of the new” associated with an engagement with art?13  
•	 What responsibility do we have to our audience as subjects in/of art? 
•	 What responsibility do we have to our own personhood? 
This was not a question that entertained our avant-garde forbears, but it is one that is 
particularly pertinent for our new generation of artists who are working with socially 
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engaged art and artistic research. 
Shock is at the core of both the political and emancipatory nature of avant-garde art. 
Artistic shock can come in many forms and variations. However, it is most often associated 
with performance art, where an artist confronts the audience and creates an event 
that tests the boundaries and limits of what it is to be human. This is evident in Marina 
Abramovic’s Lips of Thomas (1975), Vito Acconci’s Claim (1971), Mike Parr’s Cathartic 
Action (1977) and Malevich (2002), and certain participatory works, such as Christoph 
Schlingensief’s Please Love Austria (2001).
Marina Abramovic’s Lips of Thomas, is a work that requires its audience to take action or 
not. Abramovic first performed Lips of Thomas at Krinzinger Gallery in Innsbruck in 1975. 
Her performance text sets out the order of proceedings:
I slowly eat 1 kilo of honey with a silver spoon.
I slowly drink 1 liter of red wine out of a crystal glass.
I break the glass with my right hand.
I cut a five pointed star on my stomach with a razor blade.
I violently whip myself until I no longer feel any pain.
I lay down on a cross made of ice blocks.
The heat of a suspended space heater pointed at my stomach  
Causes the cut star to bleed.
The rest of my body begins to freeze
In a postscript to the performance, Abramovic perfunctorily notes that the performance 
reached its completion when individuals in the audience could no longer stand it and 
intervened; “I remain on the ice cross for 30 minutes until the audience interrupts the 
piece by removing the ice blocks from underneath” (Abramovic 1998: 99)14 .
In her thesis, Staging of Destruction: Performing Violence in Post Dramatic Theatre 
(2007), Brechtje Cornelia Maria Beuker observes that the audience became so distressed 
and uncomfortable at the self-imposed ‘risk to life’ in front of them, that some of them 
could no longer accept their position as passive observers or voyeurs to Abramovic’s self 
destruction. A number of people from the audience arose and removed her from the ice 
(Beuker 2007, p. 79). While Abramovic’s postscript expresses indifference to her removal, 
Beuker suggests that she “respected her audience members as contributors to a game 
whose rules were never identifiable” (Beuker 2007, p. 79).
In describing the audience reaction to Abramovic’s performance, theatre scholar Erica 
Fischer-Lichte observes:
This reality was not merely interpreted by the audience but first and foremost 
experienced. It provoked a wide array of sensations in the spectators, ranging from 
awe, shock, horror, disgust, nausea, or vertigo, to fascination, curiosity, sympathy, or 
agony, which stirred them to actions that equally constituted reality (Fischer-Lichte 
2008, p. 17).
Here, where the artist adopted performance to test her physical and psychic limits, the 
audience was taken to the edge and plunged into crisis. Fischer-Lichte argues that the 
effect of the performance was magnified because in this singular event the audience 
did not have a point of reference and could not resort to conventional behaviour 
patterns (Fischer-Lichte 2008, p. 12). As witnesses to this event, observes Fisher-Lichte, 
the audience is “suspended between the norms and rules of art and everyday life, 
between aesthetic and ethical imperatives” (Fischer-Lichte 2008, p. 12).15 The fact that 
Lips of Thomas was an art event and not the everyday is critical to the tension between 
aesthetics and ethics and to the question of whether one should act or not.
The ambivalent reaction of the audience—ranging from “awe, shock, horror, disgust, 
nausea, or vertigo, to fascination, curiosity, sympathy and agony” recalls the aesthetics of 
the sublime, where the viewer experiences extreme agitation involving “pleasure mixed 
with pain, pleasure that comes from pain” (Lyotard 1989, p.40). This indirect or negative 
pleasure and the fact that certain members of the audience were stirred to action also 
speaks of the moral dimension in judgements of taste in Kant’s sublime—everyone 
ought to so judge.16  Abramovic’s initial performance of Lips of Thomas (and also other 
performances such as Rhythm 2 (1974), Rhythm 5 (1974)) created a rupture where she 
and the audience were faced with the possibility of her annihilation—a point where 
nothing further might happen. Christine Battersby points out that in such an encounter 
with an event beyond imagining, conflict opens up a gap between our “senses and 
our understanding, imagination or reason as the mind struggles with the infinite, the 
apparently formless or indefinite … shape that confronts it” (Battersby 2007, p. 33).   In 
this space of indeterminacy the ‘gap’ between the senses and reason and the tension 
between aesthetical judgment and ethical judgment becomes excruciatingly ‘real’.17
Vito Acconci’s performance Claim (1971) raises questions of a different order; that of 
the shock of performative violence and the responsibility facing a ‘knowing’ audience-
becoming-participant. Claim, a work staged in the Avalanche magazine’s studio in New 
York, involved a confrontation between the audience as participant and the artist. In 
the performance Acconci was located at the bottom of the stairs in the basement of 
the studio, blindfolded and equipped with lead pipes and a crow bar. As part of the 
performance, he had set himself a specific directive: when anyone came down the stairs, 
he would swing wildly at them with his arsenal. As he waited, he engaged in monotonous 
and repetitive self talk: 
I don’t want anybody to come down here with me … I don’t want anybody to come 
down here with me … I want to keep anybody out of here… I’ve got to really mean 
this … I’ll keep anybody from coming down the stairs … I’ll keep anybody off the 
stairs … I don’t want anybody with me ... I don’t want anybody down here… I want 
the basement to be mine … It’s mine … It’s mine … I’ve got to keep talking … I’ve 
got to really believe this … I’ve got to really believe this … I’ve got to talk myself into 
this … I don’t want anyone to come down here …  I want to stay alone here … The 
basement is mine … I’ve got to really mean this ….18 
In reflecting on the performance Acconci made the following observations:
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So anytime I hear somebody coming down the stairs—And I’m blindfolded. I 
mentioned that. Anytime I hear somebody, I swing the lead pipe, the crowbar in front 
of me, as the title of the piece tries to say, claiming the space. So it was an attempt to 
hypnotize myself. And it kind of worked. By the second hour, I think I was—I’m glad 
this didn’t happen, but I could have killed somebody (Acconci in interview with Jeff 
Weinstein, 2012).
Claim (1971) was a three-hour performance, inspired by the events of the Vietnam war. 
However, what had started out as “an attempt to make performance be an interaction 
between I and you, between I and another person,” ended up with Acconci admitting 
that in the delirium of the performance he turned people into abstractions (Acconci, 
interview with Jeff Weinstein, 2012). In the context of this essay, what is perhaps the 
most important issue is the question of the responsibility of the audience in their decision 
to “participate” in Acconci’s performance. The audience members were able to view the 
artist in the basement via a video screen link-up to a camera in the basement and entered 
this space ‘at their own risk.’ This forewarning provides a very different context than that 
of Lips of Thomas.
A third kind of artistic shock, is the “shock” that renders its audience speechless, as 
in the performance work of such artists as Mike Parr’s Cathartic Action/Social Gestus 
Number 5 (1977).19  Mike Parr is an Australian performance artist who pushes his body 
to the limit through his performances. In 1977 in a performance Cathartic Action, Mike 
Parr took a meat cleaver and chopped off his left arm. As the lifeless arm lay on the 
table a profound shock registered in the gathered crowd. The fact that many in the 
audience knew that Parr didn’t have a left arm, didn’t appear to reduce the shocking 
effect of his performance. In a subsequent performance, Malevich (2002), Parr had 
himself blindfolded and nailed to a wall for three days as a protest against the Australian 
Government’s imprisonment of refugees in detention centres in the middle of Australia’s 
inhospitable desert country. During the time of his self-imposed detention, Adam Geczy 
notes, Parr remained pinned to the wall with gaffer tape over his eyes to deprive him of 
all sensory stimulation beyond what he could hear and sense (Geczy 2002-3, p. 28). The 
performance was broadcast over the web. 
This raises quite different experiences for both audience and the performer. While Parr 
was subject to extreme privation and the possibility that the ‘It happens’ will no longer 
happen, the audience was able to log on and off at will, “making the world immediately 
adjacent while safely distant” (Gilbert-Rolfe, 1999, p. 6). Geczy summed up the 
aesthetic stakes when he observed that “when the dynamic force, that presentness, of a 
performance is mediated via something like a screen, the differences tend to be flattened, 
the viewer becomes more of a voyeur, protected by distance, and the spectacle becomes 
more horror-cabinet, or more hysterical….” (Geczy, 2002) There is no agitation—no 
tension and no relief, just pure spectacle. Through this distancing mechanism, the viewers 
did not have to ‘face up’ and take responsibility as they did in Abramovic’s Lips of Thomas 
or Parr’s Cathartic Action/Social Gestus Number 5.
The performances of Abramovic and Parr were characterised by immediacy and presence, 
producing a shock to the senses, that, in different ways plunged their audiences into crisis 
and asked them to face and “deal” with something outside their everyday experience. While 
I have suggested that the shock or cleavage produced by extreme performances may be 
understood in terms of the aesthetics of the sublime, the question of how its effects affect 
both audience and performer and what actions they take, invokes ethical questions for 
both. Abramovic is testing her own physical and psychic limits. However, Abramovic is also 
concerned with identifying and testing the limits of the audience’s relationship with her 
and with themselves. She is the event in which something rather nothing is happening—the 
audience can act or not. 
Fischer-Lichte suggests that this shock provides the foundations of the transformative 
power of art. In such extreme performance work, the artist is not enacting the ‘as if’ 
of theatre; s/he is not expressing some inner self nor is s/he is not producing a re-
presentation of anything in the world. The artist is working at the threshold of human 
experience and the performances are actions in themselves that produce effects in the 
world. This is the performative power of art.20
The “effects” that art may have in the world relate to its paradoxical nature. In her book, 
Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship, art historian and theorist 
Claire Bishop notes that the paradoxical nature of art is that it is both grounded in reality 
and a suspension of reality (Bishop 2012, p. 279). In this way, as I have noted earlier, art 
has the capacity to open up and illuminate ethical dimensions in life. Bishop cites the 
participatory work, Christoph Schlingensief’s Please Love Austria (2001), as an example of 
where aesthetic experience opens onto the ethical and asks us to take stock of the stakes 
involved.
Please Love Austria was a work conceived and produced in response to the election 
success of the far-right xenophobic nationalist party, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
(FPÖ) in Austria. This election success occurred at a time when there was increasing 
tension and community discontent around the number of ‘foreigners’ seeking asylum 
in Austria. Schlingensief set the scene by relocating a shipping container to the centre 
of the Vienna and erecting a large banner Ausländer Raus (Foreigners Out) on top of it. 
The shipping container became the temporary ‘home’ for a group of asylum seekers who 
were relocated from a deportation centre outside of Vienna and they became subject to a 
Big Brother type scenario. Bishop describes this in the following way:
Their activities were broadcast through internet television station webfreetv.com 
and via this station viewers could vote daily for the ejection of their least favourite 
refugee. At 8 p.m. every day, for six days, the two most unpopular inhabitants were sent 
back to the deportation centre … As the various participants were evicted, Schlingensief 
provided a running commentary (through a megaphone) to the mob below: ‘It is a black 
man! Once again Austria has evicted a darkie!’ (Bishop 2012, p. 280-282).
Bishop notes that while Schlingensief’s provocation was “a critique of xenophobia and its 
institutions”, it remained ambiguous, being both praised and condemned from both sides 
of politics (Bishop 2012, p. 282).   What was shocking, observes Bishop, was the fact that 
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Figure 3. Amy Spiers and Catherine Ryan, Nothing to See Here (Dispersal), 2014. Photo by John Possemato.
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“Schlingensief’s container caused more public agitation and distress than the presence 
of a real deportation centre a few miles outside Vienna … an artistic representation of 
detention has more power to attract dissensus than an actual institution of detention” 
(Bishop 2013, p. 283).
 
While Schlingensief was the performer for much of the performance and the refugee 
participants wore an assortment of disguises to prevent their identification, this work 
(as his previous project Chance 2000) does raise questions about the use of participants 
for Schlingensief’s own ends and his care or care-lessness towards their welfare. What is 
Schlingensief’s duty of care to his participants? Would it be any different if he was doing 
artistic research?
Each of the works that I have outlined above operates in a different register and raises 
complex questions for us to consider. Abramovic and Parr put their own bodies to the 
test and the audience is challenged to act or not: In Acconci’s Claim, the audience 
became participants knowingly in an act that puts their own safety at risk, whilst Please 
Love Austria raises questions about the use of participants for artistic and political ends. 
However, what is common to each work is that artistic shock takes us out of our comfort 
zone. It is not the everyday experience for most ‘art’ audiences, but rather one that 
audiences and audiences-becoming-participants knowingly place themselves in. 
So now I am able to return to Nothing to See Here (Dispersal). Spiers and Ryan are keen 
for Nothing to See Here (Dispersal) to create discomfort, observing that “socially-engaged 
art should reproduce and reflect on social problems, that is, provide a social critique, 
and avoid simply presenting ameliorative, tangible solutions.”21 The danger, that faces 
Nothing to See Here (Dispersal), however, is that in its capacity to create discomfort it 
may in fact effect the opposite of what it intends. Through adopting the dynamics of 
dispersal, the performative nature of the work enacts the power of dispersal. Whilst, 
in this light, Dispersal may be considered to fulfil or exceed the promise of Ranciere’s 
theoretical proposition, it could also be argued that it troubles and may in fact reinforce 
the invisibility of our own political capacity, rather than offering tangible alternative 
positionalities.
However, as Flenady points out, art’s role is not to offer solutions and here it differs from 
social action. Rather:
The work presents a truth of our situation, a truth which would be undone by the 
addition of a false solution … the properly critical artwork … can stage nothing 
beyond it (Flenady, 2014).
In other words, through their work, Spiers and Ryan present a situated  “truth”;22 the 
fact that we live in a divided world and there is currently nothing that  “tells us what 
“resistance” should look like … and what resistance should feel like” (Flenady, 2014). 
All they can offer is the stark operations of political ordering and the deficiency of 
emancipatory politics as currently conceived and practiced. This is the shock of Dispersal.
This brings us back to the question that this essay needs to address: What are the 
ethical and aesthetic stakes involved in such performative works when art becomes 
research? Apart from Say Nothing, the examples I have presented in this essay are artistic 
performances that have not occurred under the mantle of ‘artistic research’ and have not 
had to address the demands of a research ethics committee and gain ethics approval to 
proceed. However, given the growth in artistic research within the academy, increasingly the 
questions raised in these performances need to be addressed by artistic researchers, ethics 
committees and the academy. 
Firstly, artistic researchers graduate into the artworld and in that world it is the 
community and not the ethics committee that will be the arbiter of efficacy and the 
ethics of the work.  Unlike researchers in other fields, artists do not have to undergo 
ethics review of their projects and hence artists have to take responsibility for the work 
that enters into the world. There is evidence that artistic research students ‘self-censor’ 
and avoid doing provocative research during their candidature to avoid having to obtain 
ethics approval, on the knowledge that when they graduate they won’t be required to do 
so anymore. This raises critical questions for artists, ethics committees and the academy.23 
If art is to be a site of engagement for ethical debate and, moreover, is well-positioned 
to illuminate ethical issues relevant to society, both the artistic researcher and ethics 
committees need the ethical know-how to deal with the strategies that art uses and the 
issues that may arise.24 
Secondly, ethics committees are much more familiar with and understand what 
constitutes ‘data’ in traditional qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. 
However, they are often mystified by this question in artistic research. Here I would like 
to return to the instructional work Say Nothing. The University ethics office ruled that the 
work was not technically research since Spiers “was not retaining any “data”,” and hence 
was not subject to the ethics process (Spiers 2011, p. 37). However, the photographic 
documentation of Say Nothing persists. Not only does it now form data that can be 
interrogated and analysed but because the documentation exists, I could still decipher 
the numbers under the attempted erasures, ring any of them and ‘say nothing’. Similarly, 
in ‘ephemeral’ performance artworks, such as Lips of Thomas, Cathartic Action/Social 
Gestus Number 5, Please Love Austria and Nothing to See Here (Dispersal), the video 
and photographic documentation becomes data for analysis. In other words artistic 
performances are both events with effects and data. 
Thirdly, discomfort and unease are central to art’s potency and its capacity to move 
people. Instead of avoiding the issue, artistic researchers and ethics committees need 
to be open to the possibilities and work together to establish how to deal with potential 
effects or side-effects of the work. The viewers-becoming-participants in Claim entered at 
their own risk. Yet, there are existing protocols in the arts to mitigate against unexpected 
and unwarranted shocks, for example, through warnings posted at entrances to 
exhibitions or theatres, leaflets and flyers distributed at events and, in Australia at least, 
a national film classification scheme.25 Through these existing protocols, there is sense 
in which entering a space of a performance or event with such forewarnings constitutes 
informed consent. Here audiences become responsible for their engagement with 
artworks. 
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The question of informed consent and the responsibility of the participant raises one 
final issue that is important to consider in the broader context of research ethics across 
all fields; that of the attendant question of risk in research. Harm or the risk of harm can 
be an unavoidable part of the research process and to judiciously eliminate all risk from 
research projects, apart from being impossible, would produce a situation where research 
becomes neutered; inadequate to address the complex issues that face us living in the 
world. This goes as much for clinical trials in science and medicine as it does for art. Yet 
there is a difference that has been identified through this article: in clinical trials, the risk 
or harm is not the purpose of the trial, whilst in certain art performances the risk of harm 
or discomfort may be one of the aims of the work. Is there any common ground that may 
help in the ethical review of projects across fields? Though the possible adverse effects 
experienced in a clinical trial of a new drug are of a different order from the possible 
harm or discomfort created through an engagement with art, there are similar principles 
that can be considered in an ethics review and these coalesce around the question and 
capacity of the participant to give consent: Is consent both informed and meaningful? 
Have the participants been informed of the possibility of the risks involved in participating 
in the research and do they have the capacity to make a meaningful and informed 
decision about consent? Are they able to withdraw consent or exit from the performance 
“without explanation or prejudice”? (University of Melbourne Consent Form, HREC 
090001 Version 1) In performance events such as Nothing to See Here (Dispersal), Lips 
of Thomas, Cathartic Action/Social Gestus Number 5, Please Love Austria and Claim 
the audiences who participate are ‘informed’ adults who have chosen to engage with 
the work. Protocols already exist in the artworld that inform prospective audiences/
participants of the risks, and the formalisation of protocols, through the ethics process in 
the academy, is in essence underpinned by very similar principles. Perhaps what makes 
the audience/participant in the artistic context different from the participant in a clinical 
trial is that in the face of an ethical issue arising during the event of the performance they 
may actually have the responsibility to intervene. However, that may be a false dichotomy 
I am drawing.
I have suggested that, with their allegiance to the aesthetics of the sublime and to 
notions of dissensus, many artists and artistic researchers hold dear a very different 
understanding of beneficence to that which is embodied in The National Statement, 
the defining document that underpins the principles of ethical research in Australian 
Universities. This artistic vision is underpinned by the notion that art’s beneficence lies 
in its capacity to create trouble and discomfort, rather than minimise discomfort. Thus 
I have argued that the speculative and provocative nature of art (and art as research) 
enables it to become a site of engagement for ethical debate with the capacity to 
illuminate some of the critical ethical issues of our age. The question that this raises is not 
whether it is ethical to create discomfort but whether it is ethical not to do so. 
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Endnotes:
1.Amy Spiers and Catherine Ryan are critical of much socially engaged art which adopts a consensus model 
and is often used by authorities to mitigate dissension and paper over social problems. They have adopted a 
dissensus model whereby socially-engaged art operates as a critique. Spiers comments that  ‘problems need 
to be thought (and fought)’, unpublished conference paper, pp. 1 – 2.
2 In her article, ‘On ‘Shock:’ The Artistic Imagination of Benjamin and Brecht,’ Mara Polgovsky Ezcurra 
(2012) proposes that shock is a central concept of modernist aesthetics. She cites Walter Benjamin 
as a key exponent. Contemporary Aesthetics, Vol 10, Retrieved, February 2, 2015, from http://www.
contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=659. 
3 Instructional artworks are associated with conceptual art, a movement in art that gives precedence to ideas 
and concepts over visual aesthetics or material concerns. The artworks are constructed by simply following 
the textual description provided by the artist. 
4 Email correspondence between the HEAG and Amy Spiers, 26 July, 2011, quoted in Spiers 2011, p. 37.
5 The VCA took advice from the University of Melbourne ethics office, which, after due consideration, ruled that 
the work was not technically “research” since the Spiers ‘was not retaining any “data”,’ and hence the project 
proceeded as it had been designed (Spiers 2011, p. 37). 
6 Whilst it could be argued that “relationship” and relationality has replaced “shock” as a key value in socially 
engaged art, the contemporary critique of consensus and the commitment of many socially engaged artists to 
Ranciere’s theoretical work on dissensus as a political strategy and alternative to consensus, has rekindled an 
allegiance to the notion of “shock.”
7 Heidegger’s philosophy is concerned with the question: What is the meaning of Being? Being (da Sein) is the 
‘isness’ or essence of being.
8 For a fuller explanation of the place of “strife” in art, see chapter 2 ‘Art, Art Business and the Work of Art’ in B. 
Bolt, Heidegger Reframed: Interpreting Key Thinkers For the Arts (2011) I.B.Tauris, London.
9 Heidegger contends that fundamental to the Being of human beings is the capacity to go beyond oneself. He 
argues that the fundamental condition of being human is their “throwness.” In its state of throwness, Dasein 
(humans) seizes possibility in its very and every possibility.
10 The terms ‘aesthetics’ and ‘esthetics’ are interchangeable. Lyotard adopts the American usage, esthetics in 
his 1984 article, ‘The sublime and the avant-garde’.
11 See Christine Battersby’s The Sublime, Terror and Human Difference. London: Routledge, 2007.
12 In her presentations on ethics, clinical ethicist Lynn Gillam puts forward a series questions that researchers 
and ethics committees should ask of a research project when considering whether there are any ethical issues 
of concern in the research design: Flags: Are there aspects to the research that seem ethically worrying?; 
Principles: Do you see any threats to autonomy, privacy or any risks of harm?; Imaginative Identification: 
What would it be like to be a participant in this project?; Does the research have an appropriate ethical 
orientation towards participants: The researcher values them as people and not guinea pigs?
13 See Bolt  (2004) ‘The Exegesis and the Shock of the New’ in Text Special Issue Website Series, Number3 April, 
Illuminating the Exegesis, <http://www.textjournal.com.au/speciss/issue3/bolt.htm>
14 Abramovic, Marina, (1998) Artist Body: Performances 1969-1998, Milano: Charta, p. 99. See also the 
documentary and performance text for Lips of Thomas,  <http://curatorsoffice.com/gallery/self/abramovic1.
htm>.
15 In her monograph The Transformative Power of Performance (2008) Erica Fischer-Lichte works with Marina 
Abramovic’s performance Lips of Thomas (1995) to argue for an aesthetics of the performative.
16 In The Sublime, Terror and Human Difference (2007) Christine Battersby notes that in Kant’s thinking, 
“‘everyone’ means the paradigm rational man … (and that) can mean that whole classes of persons can 
fall outside the imagined community of rational beings who attain pleasure via the transcendence of fear.” 
(Battersby 2007: 33)
17 “Real” here refers to the Lacanian psycho-analytic understanding of the “real” which is the pre-symbolic 
stage of corporeality into which we as humans are born. It is theorised as that psychic realm that cannot 
not contained in language. The “real” disrupts rationality. See Jacques Lacan (1977) The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-analysis, ed J-A Miller, trans A. Sheridan, London: Hogarth Press: 67-78
18 See excerpts from Vito Acconci’s Claim at:  <https://archive.org/details/ubu-acconci_clai>
19 Mike Parr’s Cathartic Action/Social Gestus Number 5 (1977) was performed at the Sculpture Centre in 
Sydney, Australia.
20 For a discussion on performativity and performativity in art, see Barbara Bolt Art Beyond Representation: The 
Performative Power of the Image (2004) and James Loxley Performativity (2007).
21 Email conversation with Amy Spiers, 7th July 2014. For Amy Spiers socially-engaged art should offer a 
critique. In a critique ‘problems need to be thought (and fought).’ unpublished conference paper, p.1. 
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22 See Donna Haraway’s essay ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective,’ for a discussion of the notion of ‘situated truth’.
23 A pilot study into the perception of the ethics process amongst academics in the creative arts at the 
University of Melbourne in 2009 revealed that research students tended to shift their research to avoid 
having to negotiate ethics approval. See B. Bolt, R. Vincs, R. Alsop, M. Sierra, and G. Kett, Research Ethics and 
the Creative Arts, 2010, p. 19.
24 For a discussion of ethical know-how, see B. Bolt, K. MacNeil and P. Ednie Brown (2014) ‘Creative Practice, 
Research Ethics and the Doctoral Thesis,’ Doctoral Writing in the Creative and Performing Arts: The 
researcher/practitioner nexus, UK, Libri, pp. 79 – 97.
25 See K. MacNeill and B. Bolt, ‘The ‘legitimate’ limits of arts practice’ in Real Time, Issue 104, August- 
September 2011, http://www.realtimearts.net/article/issue104/10384.
